The so-called dividing instant (DI) problem is an ancient historical puzzle encountered when attempting to represent what happens at the boundary instant which divides two successive states. The specification of such a problem requires a thorough exploration of the primitives of the temporal ontology and the corresponding time structure, as well as the conditions that the resulting temporal models must satisfy. The problem is closely related to the question of how to characterize the relationship between time periods with positive duration and time instants with no duration. It involves the characterization of the 'closed' and 'open' nature of time intervals, i.e. whether time intervals include their ending points or not. In the domain of artificial intelligence, the DI problem may be treated as an issue of how to represent different assumptions (or hypotheses) about the DI in a consistent way. In this paper, we shall examine various temporal models including those based solely on points, those based solely on intervals and those based on both points and intervals, and point out the corresponding DI problem with regard to each of these temporal models. We shall propose a classification of assumptions about the DI and provide a solution to the corresponding problem.
INTRODUCTION
The dividing instant (DI) problem was formally named by van Benthem [1] in a discussion about the contradictions of changes taking place in time. Van Benthem cites the example of a fire that has been burning and is later burnt out, and asks the question as to exactly what happens at the intermediate instant between the two successive states of burning and being extinguished. In another description of the problem, Allen [2] gives an example of a light that has been off, and becomes on after it is switched on. Is the light off or on at the switching point?
These two examples assert that a proposition holds for a time period and then ceases to hold for a subsequent period. How are we going to decide the truth-value for the proposition at the dividing instant that divides these two successive time periods? It seems that we have no more reason for preferring either that the proposition is true or false at the dividing point-the choice must be artificial. For example, we have no better reason at all for saying that the light is off at the switching point, than for saying that it is on. Therefore, one might either claim that the light is both off and on at the switching point, or it is neither off nor on. Semantically, both these two are absurd: the former claim violates the Law of Contradiction and the latter violates the Law of Excluded Third [1] .
Philosophical questions like the puzzle of the DI can go back more than 2300 years to the era of Aristotle (see 234a in Physica VI [3] ). As with many famous philosophical questions, there are various ways to respond to the DI problem. Among these responses are the following.
• The DI problem only arises when one insists on associating a proposition with a time point that, according to Allen's claim [2, 4] , is not an entity at which things happen or are true. Therefore, interval-based systems that exclude points from the temporal ontology do not suffer such a problem at all.
• The approach that characterizes all intervals as semiopen, e.g. left-closed and right-open, will make successive time intervals sit conveniently next to one another [5] . Therefore, if a proposition holds true throughout a time interval and then holds false throughout a subsequent interval, its truth-value at the dividing instant that divides two such successive intervals will be specified as false. This approach has been criticized as arbitrary/artificial [2, 4, 6] , since there is no reason at all for specifying all intervals as, say, left-closed and right-open, rather than for specifying them as, e.g. left-open and right-closed. So what?
As long as such a practical solution is workable for most applications, why should we bother with the philosophical arguments? • The DI is an issue about interfacing different kinds of propositions, namely the problem of relating the truth of a proposition over an interval to its truth at a point. The problem arises when one conflates different views of temporal structure, and argues as if the same predicate(s), e.g. 'a body's being in a particular position' or 'a body's being in motion', applies validly and meaningfully to both extended intervals and points with no duration [7] .
In this paper, we shall consider each of these responses in detail. First of all, it is interesting to note that some of those ancient historical problems like the puzzle of the DI have come up again and again, and can raise motivating and important issues in modern life. For instance, as opposed to a philosophical puzzle, the DI has been noted within the artificial intelligence (AI) community as a longstanding and ongoing problem since the beginning of the 1980s [2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9] . In particular, over the spring and summer of 1998, the DI problem sparked a lively discussion on the structure of time and temporal modelling in the News Journal on Reasoning about Actions and Change of Electronic Transactions on Artificial Intelligence [7] . In fact, as van Benthem points out [7] , the specification of the DI problem requires a thorough exploration of the primitives of the temporal ontology and the corresponding time structure; also, it involves the conditions that the resulting temporal models must satisfy. The problem is closely related to the question of how to characterize the relationship between time periods, with positive duration, and time instants with no duration. It involves the characterization of the 'closed' and 'open' nature of time intervals, i.e. whether time intervals include their ending points or not [4, 6, 8] .
Generally speaking, time representation and temporal reasoning play an important role for most AI systems. From a practical point of view, researchers in the AI field often need to make a choice as to the temporal formalism that they use. Chief amongst these choices is whether to use an interval-based system such as that of Allen [2, 4] , or a version of the classical point-based system. One of the prime motivators of Allen's interval-based temporal logic is avoidance of the DI problem [2, 4] . In making the other choice, i.e. the point-based system, researchers are then forced to specify if a given proposition holds true at time points which are entities at which things happen or are true. This virtually leads to the annoying question of whether or not a given point is part of or a member of a given interval. In other words, in a point-based system, one has to adopt one of the options as to the 'closed' and 'open' nature of intervals with which propositions are to be associated. For instance, in the glossary of temporal database concepts [10] , Jensen et al. have given definitions of valid time and transaction time: the valid time of a fact is the time when the fact is true in the modelled reality; and the transaction time of a database fact is the time when the fact is current in the database and may be retrieved. The valid time of a database fact is usually given in the form of a time interval, initiating from its left-ending point (i.e. from), and terminating at its right-ending point (i.e. to). Also, the transaction time is usually associated with two time points: the time the fact was entered into the database (i.e. start), and the time it was removed (i.e. stop) [11] . However, a decision must be taken as to the question of whether a fact is valid or not at the two ending points, from and to, of the valid time interval. As for transaction time, it also has to be specified whether, or which of, the two ending points (i.e. start and stop) belong to the transaction time interval. For example, in [11] , both intervals, for valid time and transaction time, are taken as closed on the left and open on the right. However, it is of importance to note that, to represent temporal knowledge in the domain of AI, sometimes it is necessary to assume a dividing instant between two intervals; e.g. for being able to say that a ball that has been thrown vertically up into the air will be motionless (having zero velocity) at a certain point in time, i.e. when the ball reaches the apex. For some other situations it may be desirable not to have such an intervening time point, as in the case of two successive intervals, for instance, one where a fire is burning and the next where the fire is burnt out. In addition, for specified applications like temporal database management, it is arbitrary but effective to assume that the time point separating successive states is excluded from the interval on its left but belongs to the interval on its right. However, in general, to make such kinds of decisions, the fundamental point-based time domain will have to be agent-specific. Also, it will be local to each fact even in the same database, so that if additional information or assumptions are added to the fact description, one must change the time domain accordingly. In fact, it even becomes necessary to revise the time domain each time a query is asked for a certain fact.
What we would like to point out in this paper is that, from different points of view or for different applications in the domain of AI, one can have different assumptions (hypotheses) about the DIs. Once these assumptions have been made, they may be treated as given facts or knowledge regarding the DI. As for the objective of knowledge representation, the questions are: 'how to express these assumptions?' and 'what are the limitations of some existing temporal systems as regards this issue?'. Ideally, one would expect a formalism that is capable of expressing any given assumption. In other words, as long as certain assumptions about the DI are given, the formalism should be able to express these facts successfully in a consistent way.
With this objective, in Section 2, we shall examine some representative temporal models, including those based solely on points, those based solely on intervals and those based on both intervals and points. We will investigate, in Section 3, what (if it exists) the corresponding problem with regard to the DI is. A classification of possible assumptions about the DI is given in Section 4. Section 5 draws observations on the expressiveness of different approaches as regards the DI issue and provides a consistent representation of various assumptions about the DI. Finally, Section 6 recapitulates and concludes the paper.
TEMPORAL PRIMITIVES AND TEMPORAL MODELS
Time plays an essential role in modelling natural phenomena and human activities. Over the past two decades, particularly in the domain of AI, many temporal models have been proposed with different objectives and motivations. These various systems are similar in many respects, but there are subtle differences in terminology and basic theory that derive from the differences in approach. • points, i.e. instants of time with no duration;
• intervals, i.e. periods of time with positive duration;
• both points and intervals.
The most traditional structure of time is the standard point-based theory adopted in classical physics. In general, a point-based theory P is an ordering (P , ), where P is a set of points and is a relation which partially orders P . For particular applications, the characteristics of a point-based system may be specified in great detail, e.g. linearly/non-linearly ordered, dense/discrete and bounded/unbounded, etc. Three obvious models are the realnumbers time (R, ), rational-numbers time (Q, ) and integer-numbers time (Z, ), where denotes the usual partial order relation. Examples of point-based systems are the Situation Calculus of McCarthy and Hayes [12] , Bruce's Cronos [13] and McDermott's temporal logic [14] . In a point-based theory, as derived temporal objects, intervals are usually defined as ordered pairs:
A binary relation 'Meets' over I p may be defined by
Other binary relations such as 'Equal', 'Before', 'Overlaps', 'Starts', 'During' and 'After', as well as the corresponding reverse relations [13] , can be derived from the single relation 'Meets'. The point-based mathematical structure of time has been challenged by many thinkers/researchers who believe that time intervals are more suited for the expression of common sense temporal knowledge, especially in the domain of linguistics and AI. Therefore, intervals should be treated as the temporal primitive, where points may be constructed at a subsidiary status as 'maximal nests' of intervals that share a common intersection [15] or as 'meeting places' of intervals [6, 16, 17 ].
Allen's interval calculus [2] is a typical example of the interval-based approach. It posits a pair (I , R), where I is a set of intervals and R is a set of binary relations over I , including: 'Meets', 'Met by', 'Equal', 'Before', 'After', 'Overlaps', 'Overlapped by', 'Starts', 'Starts by', 'During', 'Contains', 'Finishes' and 'Finished by'. The intuitive meaning of Meets(i 1 , i 2 ) is that interval i 1 is one of the immediate predecessors (not necessarily the unique one) of interval i 2 . Later, in [16, 18] , the 'Meets' relation is formally characterized as primitive, from which the other 12 binary relations may be derived.
As Allen claims in his papers [2, 4] , an interval-based approach avoids the annoying question of whether or not a given point is part of or a member of a given interval. Allen's contention is that nothing can be true at a point, for a point is not an entity at which things happen or are true.
However, as Galton shows in his critical examination of Allen's interval logic [6] , a theory of time based only on intervals is not adequate, as it stands, for reasoning correctly about continuous change. In fact, many common sense situations suggest the need for the inclusion of time points in the temporal ontology as an entity different from intervals. For instance, it is intuitive and convenient to say that instantaneous events, e.g. 'The court was adjourned at 4:00pm', 'The light was automatically switched on at 8:00am' and so on, occur at time points rather than intervals (no matter how small they are).
To characterize the times that some 'instant-like' events occupy, Allen and Hayes [18] introduce the idea of very short intervals, called moments. A moment is simply a non-decomposable time interval. The important distinction between moments and points is: although being nondecomposable, moments are defined by having extent and by means of having distinct start and end points, while extent-less points may be implicitly defined in terms of the 'Meets' relation, together with 'START' and 'END' functions [16, 17] . Relating to the 'Meets' relation, another obvious difference between points and moments is that moments can meet other real intervals (but by definition, moments cannot meet other moments), and hence stand between them, while points are not treated as primitive objects and cannot meet anything.
In order to overcome the limitations of an interval-based approach while retaining its convenience of expression, a third approach has been introduced [8, 19] , which treats both points and intervals as primitives. In [8] , a general time theory is proposed based on both points and intervals, for making temporal reference to instantaneous phenomena with zero duration and periodic phenomena which last for some positive duration, respectively. Points and intervals are addressed as temporal primitives on an equal footing: points do not have to be defined as limits of intervals and intervals do not have to be constructed out of points either. Actually, similar to Allen and Hayes' approach [18] , the primitive relation 'Meets' (denoting the immediate predecessor relation) can be defined over the set of time elements which consists of both intervals and points. In terms of the single 'Meets' relation, there are in total 30 relations over time elements which can be classified into the following groups: In addition, in the theory based on both points and intervals as primitives, although there are no definitions about the ending points for intervals, the formalism allows the expression of the 'open' and 'closed' nature of intervals, which can be formally defined as: (2, 5] . Similarly, (2, 5] which does include number 5 is 'right-closed', since both point 5 and interval (2, 5] are immediate predecessors of interval (5, 8) .
It is important to note that, no matter what the temporal primitives on which the model is based, the formula Meets(t 1 , t 2 ) denotes that t 1 is an immediate predecessor of t 2 . In other words, there is no gap between the two time elements, not even a point, let alone any moment or interval.
VARIOUS VERSIONS OF DIP
To generate change, in addition to a time theory, we need to have states of affairs holding or not holding at different times [20] . In this paper, we shall employ a meta-predicate Holds [21, 22] , to furnish the formula Holds(f, t) for each pair of a fluent f and a time element t, denoting that fluent f holds true for time t. Here, a fluent is simply a proposition whose truth value is dependent on the time, such that
where
In(t, t) ⇔ Starts(t , t)∨During(t , t)∨Finishes(t , t).
That is, if a fluent holds true over an interval then it holds true over any part of that interval [2, 4] .
With respect to different temporal models there are various versions of the DI problem. Virtually, the specification of such a problem involves the primitives of the temporal ontology and the corresponding time structure, as well as the conditions that the resulting temporal models must satisfy.
Point-based versions
In a point-based temporal model, the fact that a fluent F and its negation not(F ) hold true throughout two successive time periods, P 1 , P and P , P 2 , respectively, can be expressed as Holds(F,
Here, the two states, 'F holds true' and 'F holds false', meet each other; and intuitively, point P is the dividing instant that divides the corresponding two successive intervals P 1 , P and P , P 2 .
The question is what the truth-value of fluent F at point P should be, i.e. does fluent F hold true or false at point P ? In terms of the 'open' and 'closed' nature of point-based intervals, it becomes the question as which of the two successive intervals is closed/open at point P ? In other words, does point P belong to interval P 1 , P or interval P , P 2 ?
By the Law of Contradiction and the Law of Excluded Third, we have
where '∇' denotes 'exclusive or', i.e. on the one hand F cannot hold both true and false at P ; on the other hand, F cannot hold neither true nor false at P . Now, the question left is which choice are we going to take? As proposed by some researchers, one may simply take, say, the second one. That is to assume that all intervals are left-closed and right-open and, in this way, successive time intervals will sit conveniently next to one another. Therefore, for any fluent that holds true for a time interval and then holds false for a subsequent interval, its truth-value at the dividing instant will be simply specified as false.
The above 'semi-open' approach virtually provides a practical solution that works for most applications; for instance, temporal database systems management [5, 10, 11] . However, from the point of view of philosophy and general treatments, it has been criticized by other researchers as arbitrary and hence unsatisfactory [2, 6] . In fact, such an arbitrary approach would become incapable of expressing general temporal assumptions. For instance, for some reason, one may impose the following assumptions:
• both fluents F 1 and F 2 hold true throughout interval P 1 , P ; • both fluents F 1 and F 2 hold false throughout interval P , P 2 ; • F 1 holds true at point P ; and • F 2 holds false at point P .
Then, how are we going to decide the structure of our 'semi-open' intervals? Are they 'left-open' or 'right-open'? Actually, no matter what single choice we take for the structure of intervals, it is impossible to express all the above assumptions together in a consistent way. To be able to do this, one has to add some fundamental features to the structures of intervals based on points (see Section 5).
Interval-based versions
In a 'pure' interval-based system where time points are totally excluded from the temporal ontology, the dividing instant problem does not arise since such dividing points are not entities at which things happen or are true [2] .
However, many common sense situations suggest the need for modelling instantaneous phenomena in terms of time points. As mentioned in Section 2, in temporal systems that treat intervals as primitives, points may be constructed at a subsidiary status as 'maximal nests' of intervals that share a common intersection [15] or as 'meeting places' of intervals [6, 16, 17] . For instance, while retaining the idea that there is a point at the meeting place where two intervals meet each other, Galton [6] introduces two additional temporal relations as an extension to Allen's interval theory [4] . First, the point where two intervals meet each other is said to fall 'Within' the ordered union of these two intervals and second, the same point is said to 'Limit' both of these two intervals, the former at its end, the latter at its beginning. Galton uses notions Within(p, i) and Limits(p, i) to represent that a point p falls 'within' and 'limits' an interval i, respectively. Now, consider again the situation that fluent F holds true throughout interval I and then holds false throughout the subsequent interval J , i.e.
Holds(F, I ) ∧ Holds(not(F ), J )
Meets(I, J ).
If we use P to denote the point that limits both interval I and interval J :
then, as with point-based systems, the same question arises: Is it fluent F or its negation not(F ) that holds true at point p? Again, on the one hand, by the Law of Contradiction, F and not(F ) cannot both hold true at P ; and, on the other hand, by the Law of Excluded Third, it cannot be the case that neither F nor not(F ) holds true at P . Therefore, one has to arbitrarily make the choice between Holds(F, P ) and Holds(not(F ), P ). As pointed out in the introduction, it may be argued that the above problem with regard to the dividing instant arises because we conflate different views of temporal structure, as if the same predicates can meaningfully apply to both extended intervals and points with no duration. For instance, 'moving' is a predicate which applies meaningfully to objects over extended time intervals-it may not make any reasonable sense at all if ones asks whether an object 'moves' at some point with no duration. In order to do this, one may, in the first place, have to stretch the original predicate: we might say that an object 'moves' at point p if and only if there exists some interval i containing p such that the object 'moves' over i in the original phenomenological sense [7] .
However, the question is how are we going to classify propositions in general as to which originally applies to time intervals and which originally applies to time points. This in fact leads to the problem of relating the truth of a fluent on intervals to its truth at points and it is not an easy task. For instance, in [6] , Galton introduces two kinds of proposition, i.e. states of position and states of motion:
• states of position can hold at isolated instants and if a state of position holds throughout an interval, then it must hold at the limits of that interval; • states of motion cannot hold at isolated instants: if a state of motion holds at an instant then it must hold throughout some interval within which that instant falls. In case (a), if we assume that F holds at point P , then by the definition of states of motion, it must hold throughout some interval I such that Within(P , I ). Hence, together with Meets(I, J ), Limits(P , I ) and Limits(P , J ), we can infer that Overlaps(I , J ). Hence, both states, F and not(F ), which are in conflict with each other, will hold throughout an interval which is a common subinterval of both I and J . This obviously violates the Law of Contradiction [1] .
Similarly, if not(F ) holds at point P , then it must hold throughout some interval I such that Within(P , I ). Hence, together with Meets(I, J ), Limits(P , I ) and Limits(P , J ), we can infer that Overlaps(I, I ). Again, both F and not(F ) will hold throughout the common subinterval of I and I .
Hence, the above proof shows that neither F nor not(F ) will hold at the point P . This obviously violates the Law of Excluded Third [1] .
For case (b), by the definition of states of position, since F holds throughout interval I , F must hold at the limits of I . Therefore, with Limits(P , I ) we have Holds (F, P ) ; similarly, since not(F ) holds throughout interval J , it must hold at the limits of J . Therefore, again, with Limits(P , J ) we have Holds(not(F ), P ) as well. Obviously, this violates the Law of Contradiction.
For the remaining two cases, (c) and (d), the choice between which of them applies seems to be arbitrary and unresolved. For example, let F and not(F ) denote 'the light is on' and 'the light is not on' that apply to the two states before and after the light is switched off, respectively. Then which should be considered as a state of position and which should be addressed as a state of motion? In his later work [23] , Galton himself points out that the dichotomy of states of position and states of motion is inadequate for general modelling, and proposes the notion of dominance space to refine it. In fact, there is a quite important and bulky literature in linguistics. For instance, Vendler's pioneering work related to problems of aspect in verbal constructions [24] actually presents a background to Allen's and Galton's proposals. In [24] , Vendler classifies various species of verb, including Activities, Accomplishments, Achievements and States.
There are some fundamental differences between the characterizations of these four categories. For example, one of the key differences between activities and accomplishments is that an accomplishment has an intrinsic termination point, at which it becomes complete, whereas the notion of completion is absent from an activity. Also, an achievement differs from an accomplishment in that the latter includes the whole process leading to its termination whereas the former is, as it were, all termination. Finally, a state characterizes what philosophers call the quality of homogeneity, e.g. 'John loved Mary from t 1 to t 2 ' means that at any instant between t 1 and t 2 John loved Mary.
Subsequent proposals focusing on the structure of events and their semantic interpretation have advanced Vendler's pioneering work. For instance in the field of computational linguistics, the works of Moens and Steedman [25] , Passonneau [26] , Dahlgren et al. [27] and Grasso et al. [28] have considerably refined Vendler's ideas. Also, from the point of view of temporal logic, Shoham [29] has proposed a category of proposition types, including downwardhereditary, upward hereditary, liquid, concatenable, gestalt and solid, and so on.
It is important to point out that, in interval-based systems, temporal granularity is an issue closely related to the DI problem. For instance, as mentioned in Section 2, in order to distinguish some 'instant-like' phenomena at very small scales, Allen and Hayes introduce the notion of moments [17, 18] . However, as Allen and Hayes themselves note [18] , a theory incorporating temporal granularity usually involves introducing a 'tolerance relation' that defines when two times are indistinguishable. For example, two intervals, I and J , might be indistinguishable if their beginning points are at most a moment apart and likewise for their end points. To ensure that the tolerance relation is an equivalence relation, Allen and Hayes propose a constraint which insists that moments never meet each other. However, such an axiom will lead to the limitation that, for any interval, either it is non-decomposable, that is, a moment, or it must be infinitely decomposable. This is because if it is only finitely decomposable, then it must be the sum of a finite number of moments which would meet one another, contrary to the constraint imposed on moments. Therefore, this actually precludes discrete models for the theory. In addition, dense models of the interval-based theory, i.e. where all intervals are infinitely decomposable, permit no moments at all. Hence models of a theory containing moments can be neither dense nor discrete.
Event/situation-based versions
In addition to the approach that associates propositions (fluents) with explicit time elements, i.e. intervals or points, an alternative is to reason about actions/events and their effects on the state of the world. McCarthy and Hayes' situation calculus [12] and Kowalski and Sergot's event calculus [30, 31] are two influential systems in this area.
There are several different versions of the situation calculus, as well as of the event calculus, in which no explicit temporal reference is addressed at all. However, this does not really bypass the DI problem. In fact, in the event calculus, being the primitives, events initiate and/or terminate relationships (including both properties of objects and relationships between objects) that are assumed to hold over time intervals. A relationship is assumed to persist both into the future until it is terminated by an event and back into the past as long as its initiating event has not been encountered [30, 31] . In the event calculus, time intervals are named by terms of the forms after(e r) and before(e r), where the first argument is the name of the event which starts or ends the time interval and the second argument names the relationship associated with the time interval. Consider the example of a light which has been off and becomes on after it is switched on. If we use E to denote the event 'Switching on the light', then following Kowalski and Sergot's notation [30] , E ends interval before(E LightOff) and starts after(E LightOn), where LightOff and LightOn denote relationships (processes) that 'The light is off' and 'The light is on', respectively. Now, the question appears: Is the light off or on at the switching point which, on the one hand, ends interval before(E LightOff) and, on the other hand, starts interval after(E LightOn)? This leads to exactly the same problem as in the case where fluents are associated directly with explicit time intervals/points, regarding the DI. Similar considerations apply to the situation calculus.
A CLASSIFICATION OF DI ASSUMPTIONS
As discussed in the above sections, from different points of view or for different applications in the domain of AI, we may have different assumptions (hypotheses) about the DIs. In fact, for the situation where F and not(F ) hold true throughout two successive interval I and interval J , respectively, there are actually three possible assumptions one may impose with respect to the boundary instant P which divides the two successive states:
That is, there are no assumptions whatsoever with respect to the dividing instant. All we are given (or all we know) is: fluent F holds throughout interval I and then ceases to hold throughout the subsequent interval J (see Figure 1) . In fact, there are two versions with respect to further interpretation of Case 1. C1.1. There is conceptually no dividing instant at all; at most, the dividing instant may be simply taken as the 'meeting place' of the two intervals-it is not a real entity at which F or not(F ) can hold. C1.2. The dividing instant does exist and is an entity at which the truth-value of fluent F can be specified. However, in this case, no knowledge (assumption) has been given regarding the truth-value of fluent F at the diving instant (say P )-it is simply unknown. In other words, no assumption is given as to the closed/open nature of interval I and interval J at point P .
Case 2. Holds(F, I )
Holds
That is, by some reason for specified applications, the assumption regarding the DI P imposed is that fluent F holds false at point P . In other words, interval I is rightopen at point P while interval J is left-closed at point P (and therefore, Meets(I, P ), see Section 2). In other words, while interval I 'Meets' interval J , point P is 'Met by' interval I and 'Starts' interval J (see Figure 2) .
It is important to point out that, unlike Vilain's definition [19] , the above assertion {point P 'Starts' interval J } is different from assertion {point P 'Meets' interval J } (see Section 2). That is, the assumption regarding the DI P imposed is that fluent F holds true at point P . In other words, interval I is assumed to be right-closed at point P and interval J is assumed to be left-open at point P (and, therefore, Meets(P , J )). That is, while interval I 'Meets' interval J , point P 'Finishes' interval I and 'Meets' interval J (see Figure 3) . Again, here, the assertion {point P 'Finishes' interval I } is different from assertion {interval I 'Meets' point P }.
In addition, there is another case which is closely related to the issue of dividing instant, that is:
Case 4. Holds(F, I )
Holds(G, J )
It is important to note that, unlike Cases 1-3, in Case 4 intervals I and J do not really meet each other immediately. There is a gap with a duration of zero, i.e. point P , standing between interval I and interval J . In other words, both intervals I and J are open at point P (see Figure 4) . However, we may still think of P as the 'dividing instant' that divides the two intervals, which meet each other almost immediately (i.e. the duration of the gap between them is zero).
REPRESENTING THE DI
To exemplify all the possible cases discussed above, consider the following typical scene: (*) A fire was burning, two lights (one green and one red) were both off, and a ball was thrown into the air from the east to the west. At the time when the ball reached its apex, the fire burnt out and the lights were switched on.
First of all, from common sense, we have the facts that:
(a) the state that the fire was burned out followed immediately the state that it was burning; (b) the state that the green light was on immediately followed the state that it was off; (c) the state that the red light was on immediately followed the state that it was off; (d) the state that the ball was at the east of and below its apex was immediately followed by the state that the ball was at its apex and which, in turn, was immediately followed by the state that the ball was at the west of and below the apex.
In addition, to illustrate all the cases as classified in Section 4, i.e. Cases 1-4, we artificially impose the following assumptions:
(e) at the time when the ball was at its apex, the green light was on; (f) at the time when the ball was at its apex, the red light was off.
It is easy to see that the above assumptions illustrate all the cases as classified in Section 4. In fact, (a) is an example of Case 1, (b) and (e) together can be seen as an example of Case 2 and (c) and (f) together is an example of Case 3. Finally, (d) is an example of Case 4.
The question now is how to express the above given assumptions simultaneously.
To model the various states of the four objects, we employ the following fluents:
Burning:
the fire was burning; GreenOn: the green light was on; RedOn: the red light was on; EastBelow: the ball was at the east of and below the apex; AtApex:
the ball was at its apex; WestBelow: the ball was at the west of and below the apex.
As mentioned in Section 2, there are mainly three kinds of approaches regarding the temporal primitive.
Approach I: based solely on points as primitives where intervals may be defined as derived objects constructed out of points. Approach II: based solely on intervals as primitives where points may be defined at a subsidiary status as 'maximal nests' of intervals that share a common intersection [15] or as 'meeting places' of intervals [6, 16, 17] . Approach III: based on both intervals and points as primitives on the same footing.
Observations on Approach I
• To express Case 1, for instance (a), the open/closed nature of intervals has to be interpreted as unspecified. Since (a)-(f) are assumptions imposed together on the scene (*),
• there is not a single interpretation that is universal for any mixture of the cases as classified in Section 4.
To be able to express (a)-(f) consistently as a whole scene, one has to add some fundamental feature to the structures of intervals constructed out of points. 
Observations on Approach II
• To express Case 1, for instance (a), one can simply associate two adjacent intervals, e.g. I and J such that Meets(I, J ), to the two successive states, 'the fire was burning' (i.e. Burning) and 'the fire was extinguished' (i.e. not(Burning)), respectively, without bothering with the representation of the state at the dividing instant, since there is no question about it at all. Therefore, this approach is more intuitive and convenient for expressing knowledge such as Case 1 in general.
• To express Case 2, for instance (b) and (e), one has to construct time points at some subsidiary status, e.g. as 'maximal nest' [15] or 'meeting places' [6, 16, 17] of intervals which are addressed as primitive. However, as shown in Section 3.2, this would in fact lead to the similar problem faced by Approach I (see the above), and this would be more difficult since in interval-based systems there are virtually no definitions about the closed/open nature of intervals. Similar observation applies to Case 3.
• It is impossible to express Case 4. This is because in approaches based on intervals only, points are, at most, taken as some subsidiary objects such as 'maximal nests' or 'meeting places' rather than primitive-they are not entities that can stand between (and therefore 'Meets' or 'Met by') temporal intervals.
Observations on Approach III
• It can successfully express all the sample cases together in a consistent way. In fact, using a temporal model based on both intervals and points as primitive (e.g. [8] ), (a), (b) and (e), (c) and (f), and (d) can be expressed, respectively, as: where Duration(P ) = 0, Duration(I n ) > 0 and Duration(J n ) > 0, n = 1, 2, 3, 4. Note here that 'Duration' is a function that assigns positive duration to time intervals and zero duration to time points [8] .
Finally, one may note that, in the example described in the above scene, for the state change of the fire, we were told not only that (a) the state that the fire was burned out followed immediately the state that it was burning, but also, namely, (a ) it is at the time when the ball reached its apex that the fire changed its state from being burning to being burnt out. This extra piece of knowledge, i.e. (a ), can also be successfully expressed. In fact, by (H1) in Section 3, we can infer that there are intervals I 1 , J 1 , I 4 and J 4 such that: Note here, following the notation used in [8] , t ⊕ t denotes the unique interval representing the union of the two adjacent time elements t and t whenever Meets(t, t ).
From I 1 ⊕ J 1 = I 4 ⊕ P ⊕ J 4 , we get Duration(I 1 ⊕ J 1 ) = Duration(I 4 ⊕ P ⊕ J 4 ), and with Duration(P ) = 0 and Duration(I 1 ) = Duration(I 4 ), we can infer that Duration(J 1 ) = Duration(J 4 ). Therefore, (A ) subsumes the knowledge that the 'meeting place' of intervals I 1 and J 1 is point P . Since the 'meeting place' of intervals I 1 and J 1 is also the 'meeting place' of intervals I 1 and J 1 , therefore the extra piece of knowledge (a ) can be subsumed from (A ).
A graphical representation of the above sample cases is shown in Figure 5 .
CONCLUSIONS
Philosophical questions like the puzzle of the DI go back to the era of Aristotle. Some of these ancient historical problems come up again and again, and can raise interesting and important issues in modern life. In this paper, we have investigated the DI problem by means of examining different responses from the points of view of different temporal approaches. We have examined some representative temporal models, including those based solely on points, those based solely on intervals and those based on both intervals and points, and investigated the corresponding DI problem. We have proposed a classification of possible assumptions about the DI and made observations on the expressiveness of some existing temporal systems as regard to the DI problem.
As pointed out in the introduction, the DI problem may be taken as an issue about interfacing different kinds of propositions, i.e. conflating different views of temporal structure and arguing if the same predicate(s) applies validly and meaningfully to both extended intervals and points with no duration. In other words, it may be addressed as the problem of relating the truth of a fluent over an interval to its truth at a point(s). In turn, this leads to the question of how to distinguish between different kinds of fluents by specifying the relation between the truth of the fluent over one time element (interval or point) and its truth over another time element. It is hoped that fine-grained distinctions of this sort may shed light on otherwise somewhat mysterious problems [29] , including the DI problem.
